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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
HARRY THORSEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

MARKAY JOHNSON, et al. ,
Defendants.
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al. ,
Case No. 880402
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HARRY THORSEN and DONALD GATES,
Defendants.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-22(i) and Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final Order and Judgment entered by
1

the Honorable Don V, Tibbs of the Sixth Judicial District Court
for the State of Utah.

The Court's Order was entered after an

initial appeal to this Court, in which this Court remanded to
the District Court for re-assessment of damages.

The judgment

giving risa to this appeal is from the Order and Judgment entered
by the Sixth Judicial District Court adjudicating the rights and
obligations of the parties after re-assessment of damages.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

m

light of the evidence before the Trial Court, did the

Court improperly value the property damaged.
2.

Given the evidence before the Trial Court/ did the Trial

Court improperly determine the size of the property damaged^
DETERMINATIVE CASE LAW
There

are

no

rules,

determinative of the issues.

statutes

or

ordinances

which

are

However, this same matter has been

before the Supreme Court prior to remand to the District Court
and is recorded at Thorsen vs. Johnson, 745 P. 2d 1243 (Utah
1987).
STATEMENT OF CASE
On

the

Estate, et
upon

4th

day

of March,

1981, Plaintiffs

Gooseberry's

al. [hereinafter referred to as Gooseberry] served

Defendants

Thorsen, et al.

[hereinafter

referred

to as

Thorsen] a Summons and Complaint (R. 6) alleging that Thorsen had
2

exceeded his right to come upon Gooseberry's property and clean
an

irrigation

property

(R.

ditch

which

1-5).

The

provided

water

ditch which

to

gives

the

Thorsenfs

rise

to these

proceedings is part of an irrigation system called the Gooseberry
Creek Irrigation System which was established before the turn of
the century and according to the Cox Decree (1933) (Tr. 458).
The shareholders are serviced by three principle diversions from
the creek known as the "A Ditch Section," MB Ditch Section" and
"C Ditch Section" (Exhibit 21).

Historically, that is from 1880,

the original ditch for the B Ditch Section has been referred to
as the "lower ditch". For one hundred years, this original "B"
ditch served the Thorsen property (T. 461).
The extension ditch was a diversion from the original ditch
and in effect, split the "B" ditch.
the

record

whether

the

There is some confusion in

lower original

extension route is the "B" ditch.

route

or

the higher

For purposes of clarity, the

original "B" ditch is referred to herein as the "lower B ditch"
and the extension ditch is referred to as the "upper B ditch".
The "lower B ditch" is the subject of this action.

Exhibit No.

22 shows the location of the ditches and properties.)
On the 31st day of August 1982, Judge Tibbs, ruling from the
bench, determined that Harry Thorsen was liable to Gooseberry
Estates for damage caused to Gooseberry's property when a ditch
3

(lower

B

ditch) was cleaned by Thorsen

(T. 563.

See also

Addendum B, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment).
In ruling, Judge Tibbs awarded to Gooseberry Estates $54,000.00
(Addendum B ) .

Gooseberry, however, candidly admitted at oral

argument before this Court on the first appeal that Thorsen had
an easement for the ditch which had been cleaned
C, Court's Opinion on First Appeal).
was

arrived

appraiser,

at

based

upon

the

(See Addendum

The judgment for $54,000.00
testimony

of

Gooseberry's

Ken Esplin, who stated that the lots were worth

$12,000.00 which had been damaged by 50% (Addendum D, Appraisal
of Ken Esplin; T. 323).

The $12,000.00 figure per lot was

arrived at by Gooseberry's appraiser by valuing the property as a
completed subdivision

(T. 323). The trial court found that nine

lots had been damaged by 50% (Addendum B ) .
Defendant

Harry

Thorsen

District Court (Addendum C ) .

appealed

the

decision

of

the

This Court determined that it was

inappropriate for the measure of damages to be calculated as a
completed

subdivision, but rather, the appropriate measure of

damages to the property would be determined by the difference in
market

value

(Addendum C).

of

the

property

before

and

after

the

injury

The Utah Supreme Court then remanded the case back

to the District Court for re-assessment of damages (Addendum C ) .
As per the opinion of this Court on the first appeal, several
4

issues and factual determinations pertinent to the matter at hand
were resolved as follows:
(a)
That counsel for Gooseberry admitted at oral
argument of the case before the Supreme Court that the
Trial Court did not find an abandonment and that
Thorsen had an easement through Gooseberry's land for
the ditch
(Thorsen vs. Johnson, 745 P.2d 1243, 1244
(1987), Addendum C ) .
(b)
That Thorsen exceeded his right to enter upon
Gooseberry's land and to clean the ditch (Thorsen at
1244, Addendum C ) .
(c) That the appropriate measure of damages for entry
upon real property is the difference between the value
of the property immediately before and immediately
after the injury (Thorsen, at 1244-45, Addendum C ) .
(d) That the $6,000.00 per lot damage found by the
lower court was based upon the testimony given by
Kenneth Esplin, that if and when the subdivision was
approved and recorded, water was made available and
the improvements were in place, the lots would sell
for $12,000.00 each.
He opined that ten of the
proposed lots were damaged so as to reduce their
potential value by 50% or $6,0000.00 each (Thorsen, at
1245, Addendum C ) .
(e)
That this Court determined that it was
inappropriate to view the Gooseberry land as a
completed subdivision and that in fact, the
appropriate measure of damages, was the diminution of
the fair market value of the property immediately
following the infliction of the damage, not what the
property may be worth when and if substantial sums of
money were expended to turn it into an improved
subdivision (Thorsen, at 1246, Addendum C ) .
(f) The Court determined that both parties had agreed
that the fair market value of the raw land in its
pristine state prior to the digging of the ditch in
question was worth $1,250.00 per acre (Thorsen, at
1246, Addendum C ) .
5

(g)
That the nine lots which the District Court
determined were completely destroyed was inappropriate
and contrary to the evidence given by Esplin when he
testified that the ditch was diminished by the value
of 50% as opposed to being totally destroyed (Thorsen,
at 1246, Addendum C ) .
(h) That the ditch widened and deepened by Thorsen
was 15 feet wide and 3,150 feet long comprising a
total acreage of 1.08 acres, which would be maximum
land which could have been totally destroyed assuming
contrary to the admission of Gooseberry's counsel that
Thorsen had no right to an easement (Thorsen, at 1247,
Addendum C ) .
(i) In short, the Court determined that the ruling of
the District Court and the analysis of Gooseberry
Estate's appraiser was flawed in two respects, in that
"there was no evidence that the 'lots' had a fair
market value of $6,000.00 before Thorsen enlarged the
ditch and there was no evidence that the ditch totally
destroyed nine lots. (Thorsen at 1245, Addendum B)
Pursuant to the original judgment entered by Judge Tibbs in
August of 1982, the Court specifically determined that nine lots
out of 33 lots in the proposed subdivision had been damaged
(Addendum B ) .

The original judgment did not mention or refer to

any of the lots other than the nine lots referred to by the Judge
Tibbs in the decision
Conclusions

of

Law,

(Addendum B ) .
and

Judgment

The Findings of Fact,

drafted

by

counsel

Gooseberry Estates specifically finds:
The Court finds that there are nine (9) lots which
were totally destroyed and the Court fixes the value
of $6,000.00 in their condition at the time of the
aforesaid advance and not in the condition they would
have become upon final development, but rather upon
the basis of improvements done upon these lots up to
the time the defendant . . . . (Addendum B)
6

for

In addition to the District Court finding that only 9 lots
were damaged, this Court, in its decision on the first appeal,
considered only the appropriateness of the damage to the area
contained in nine lots

(Addendum C ) .

As it relates to the size and value of the damaged property,
Ken Esplin, appraiser for Gooseberry Estates testified at trial:
This shows what the potential value of these lots
is. Using that and the fact that these are a little
larger and I think there will be more of a demand for
them near Salina than east of Fairview, I place the
value on this property, an average value of
$12,000.00 per lot when improvements are in place and
this multiplied by the 33 lots comes up to
$448,656.00.
Now after taking into consideration the canal that
has gone through there, I feel that there are ten
lots that are badly damaged, there are some others
that are damaged, but ten of the lots are very badly
damaged. I think they have decreased in value by 50%
or $6,000.00 per lot for a diminution because of that
canal at $60,000.00, leaving an after value of
$388,656.00. (T. 323) (Emphasis added).
At trial, Ken Esplin also testified on behalf of Gooseberry
Estates as follows:
Q:
In your letter addressed to Ken in the first
paragraph, don't you say that you are doing it on the
basis of nine lots that were damaged?
A.
Well that's a typographical error.
If it says
nine, it is the ten lots that were damaged.
Q.

Ten lots that were damaged?

A. Yes, definitely. In fact, there are about 15 that
are damaged.
I figure that 10 of the 15 or 16 that
7

were damaged severely enough to be damaged by 50% and
they're the only ones I have drawn attention to.
There are several reasons for that:
There are two of those lots that already have enough
impairment with the power lines running over them that
they were damaged down to that figure before and I
haven't given any value to that. There are reasons
why I only use instead of the total number that the
canal goes through. (T. 330)
The only place in which appraiser Ken Esplin, testifying on
behalf of Gooseberry Estates at trial, places a value on any of
the land other than the $12,000.00 per lot is his answer when
questioned what the value of the meadow or raw land was worth
that would not be subdivided, Ken Esplin testified:
The per acre value of the remainder comes out
slightly under $1,200.00 per acre as agricultural
land. (Emphasis added) (T. 335)
At

trial,

submitted
Gooseberry
expresses

appraiser

as Exhibit 33
Estates
that

his

Esplin,

on

behalf

of

Gooseberry,

(Addendum D) an appraisal

in which

in his

appraisal

introductory

is based

upon

report on
letter, he

his opinion of

diminution of value of 9 lots in Gooseberry Estates caused by the
canal through these lots (Addendum D, Appraisal of Ken Esplin).
At page 6 of Ken Esplin's appraisal Mr. Esplin identifies that
the damage caused by the ditch amounted to ten lots damaged at
50% for a total of $60,000.00

(Addendum D, Appraisal of Ken

Esplin.)
Joseph F. Stott, appraiser called on behalf of Thorsen,
8

stated that the best use of the property would be for subdivision
purposes and that the property in an unimproved state prior to
the digging of the ditch based upon similar sales of unimproved
subdivision property in the area would total $1,250.00 per acre:
A:
Yes, as contained in the appraisal, I have
indicated that the irrigations do not effect the
market value of property; however, to clean such
ditches has no measurable value or effect on the
market value.
Each sale is considered as to time,
location, physical characteristics, and condition of
sale based on the market conditions. It is my opinion
that the market value of the subject property is
$1,250.00 per acre.
Q.

And you reduce your appraisal work to a report.

A.

Yes.

Q*
Have you reduced your appraisal into a written
report.
A.

Yes I have.

Q.

And. . . .

The Court: Let me just ask a question so I understand
your last answer.
Are you saying that, in your
opinion, this ditch does not make any difference one
way or another?
A. Well, I did not appraise it as a subdivision. I
appraised as a 50.59 acres in an as is condition and
through the inspection that I have made of the
property, it is my opinion that a ditch did exist
there and the effect of those ditches are reflected in
the market value in comparison to other properties.
But the cleaning of such ditches didn't. The upper
ditch has been cleaned similar to the lower ditch. (T.
366-367)
On remand and Motion for Re-assessment of Damages, counsel

9

for Plaintiff and Defendant submitted Memorandums to the District
Court

and

in

addition, counsel

for Gooseberry

submitted

two

Affidavits both of which are attached as Addendum E.
Upon Motion for Re-assessment, the District Court determined
that instead of 9 lots being damaged as found by the very same
District Court at the time of trial, that upon re-assessment of
damages that not only were 9 lots damaged but also the remaining
24

lots

therefore

in

the

(See

proposed
Addendum

subdivision
F,

Amended

and

awarded

Findings

of

judgment
Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment).
In

addition to expending the area damaged, the District

Court also determined that the 9 lots suffered such damage that
it

is totally

useless

for

any purpose

except

grazing

and,

consequently, awarded $15,835.50 (Paragraph 1, Findings of Fact,
Addendum F.)

In addition, the Court some how also concluded that

aside from the 9 lots, the additional 24 lots suffered damage to
the extent of 50% and awarded damages for $22,950.00 (Paragraph
2, Findings of Fact, Addendum F ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The evidence before the Court requires that in applying this
Court's prior decision that the amount of damages should equal
the

diminution

in market value before
10

and

after the injury

establishes that the only diminution in value of property which
has a pre-injury value of $1,250 per acre is that portion for
which the Court determines has been totally destroyed.
POINT II
The only

property

for which defendants

are entitled to

recover damages is that amount of property determined by the
Court

encompassed

by

the

ditch

itself

minus

the

acreage

encompassed by the Thorsen easement.
ARGUMENT
The issues raised by Harry Thorsenfs appeal can easily be
categorized into two general categories.

First, what is the

fair market value of the property before and after the damage and
second, what amount of property has in fact been damaged.
INTRODUCTION
The testimony and evidence for which the District Court and
this Court has relied in determining the value of the property
damaged is the testimony presented at trial and by Affidavit of
the appraisers for the respective parties.

Ken Esplin was the

appraiser who testified for on behalf of Gooseberry Estates and
Joseph F. Stott was the appraiser who testified for and on behalf
of Harry Thorsen.
The unequivocal

testimony offered by Ken Esplin and for

which the District Court relied in entering its judgment prior to
11

the first appeal in a nut shell established three points.

First,

that the total area damaged by the ditch encompassed ten lots.
The Court, however, in its Findings of Fact prior to the first
appeal specifically found that nine lots were damaged. Secondly,
Kenneth Esplin established that the nine or ten lots had been
damaged to the extent of 50% of their value and third, that the
value of the lots assuming their value as a completed subdivision
equaled $12,000.00.

The formula set out by Kenneth Esplin was

accepted entirely by the District Court as part of its Findings,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in that the Court found nine
lots to be damaged by 50% of $12,000.00 and awarded judgment in
the amount of $54,000.00.
On appeal, the Supreme Court pointed out two flaws in the
formula asserted by appraiser Esplin and accepted by the Trial
Court:
This analysis is flawed in two respects. There was no
evidence that the lots had a fair market value of
$6,000.00 before Thorsen enlarged the ditch, and there
was no evidence that the ditch totally destroyed nine
lots.
Thorsen vs. Johnson, 745 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Utah 1987).
In short, the Supreme Court found that valuing the damaged
lots

as

a

specifically

cpmpleted

subdivision

was

improper

and

further

found that the damage to the tract of land was

something less than total destruction of nine lots.
12

POINT I
WHAT IS THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY DAMAGE BETWEEN
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE BEFORE THE INJURY AND THE FAIR
MARKET VALUE AFTER THE INJURY
As stated supra, the evidence offered at trial for which the
Court

has

damaged

relied

in establishing

is the evidence

parties.

the value of the property

supplied by the

appraisers

for the

With regard to the testimony and Affidavit offered by

Ken Esplin, three critical figures have been testified to by Mr.
Esplin.

The first figure is the determination that the lots were

worth $12,000.00 each as completed mountain subdivision lots and
that the damage to the property resulting from the cleaning of
the ditch resulted in a diminution of value of 50% per lot for
ten lots.
The second critical figure that Mr. Esplin testified to was
that the value of the meadow which comprised the remaining tract
of land which had not been contemplated as being subdivided into
lots but was part of the original piece of property purchased by
Gooseberry Estates was worth sightly under $1,200.00 per acre as
agricultural land.

The reason this figure is critical is this

Court has found and the District Court has relied as well as the
parties have relied upon the finding of this Court that both
appraisers

have

agreed

that

the

unimproved state is worth $1,250.00.
13

value

of

the

land

in an

The only testimony given by

Ken Esplin establishing the approximately $1,200.00 value is his
testimony set out supra relating to the meadow as being worth
$1,200.00

per

acre

for

"agricultural

purposes".

In prior

pleadings, counsel for Gooseberry has asserted that Mr. Esplinfs
testimony is that the $1,250.00 per acre figure was Mr. Esplin's
valuation of the land for use as a subdivision.

As a basis for

their assertion, they rely on the Affidavit attached as

E which

accompanied Gooseberry's Motion for Re-assessment of Damages in
which Mr. Esplin states in paragraph 4a:
He reiterates the testimony that the real property
subject of litigation consisting of approximately 50.9
acres was worth, without any improvements in the year
1980, the sum of $1,250.00 per acre.
The inconsistency, however, in Mr. Esplin's Affidavit is
that no where in his testimony does he say anything about the
property being worth $1,250.00 per acre other than the statement
that the meadow was worth $1,200.00 per acre for agricultural
purposes.

Consequently, there is no evidence before the Trial

Court or this Court that the $1,250.00 per acre asserted by Mr.
Esplin was a valuation of anything other than what the property
was worth for agricultural purposes.
The third critical figure testified to by Ken Esplin is
contained in his Affidavit attached to Gooseberry's Motion to
re-assess damages.

(A copy of which is attached as

Esplin's Affidavit reads in pertinent part:
14

E. )

Ken

He is of the opinion that the property's next and
highest use after development as a subdivision or
mountain development was, in the year 1980 and
immediately prior to the damage done to it by
Defendant Harry Thorsen, $100.00 per acre. He is of
the opinion that the value of the land as of February
20, 1988, is the sum of $50.00 per acre and that is
the best use to which it could be devoted now or could
have been devoted at any time after the excavation
made by Harry Thorsen.
The testimony offered by Joseph F. Stott, appraiser, for
Harry

Thorsen, testified

property

unimproved

that the

fair market value of the

prior to the cleaning

of the ditch was

$1,250.00 but further, also testified that the $1,250.00 took
into consideration the easement across the property for the ditch
for which counsel for Gooseberry Estates has acknowledged its
existence and the cleaning of the ditch as completed by Harry
Thorsen does not diminish the fair market value of the property.
The

Supreme

Court

in its previous opinion, has clearly

stated that the $6,000.00 figure arrived at by the appraiser for
Gooseberry Estates was inappropriate and specifically ruled that
the appropriate test was the diminution in market value before
and after the injury.

In determining the appropriate value of

the property prior to the damage, this Court has found that both
parties

have

agreed

finding

that

parties

that
have

the value equaled
agreed

on

$1,250.00.

a value

requires a determination of the underlying

The

of $1,250.00,

reasoning

for the

agreed market amount. According to the only testimony given by
15

Esplin,

appraiser

for

Gooseberry

Estates,

states

that

the

remainder of the property was worth slightly under $1,200.00 for
agricultural purposes.

Appraiser for Harry Thorsen testified

that he arrived at the $1,250.00 by determining what the tract of
land was worth in an unimproved state.
that this Court determined

It was upon those basis

that the pre-injury value of the

property was $1,250.00 per acre.
Joseph Stott, appraiser for Harry Thorsen, placed the postinjury value of the property at the same amount of $1,250.00 per
acre and determined that there was no diminution in the value of
the property as a result of the cleaning of the ditch.
The testimony given by the appraiser for Gooseberry Estates,
however, is somewhat ambiguous.

In the Affidavit attached, which

was submitted along with the Motion for Re-assessment of Damages,
Ken

Esplin

property

testified

was

that the only values pertinent

either

subdivision/mountain

a

valuation

lot development

of

the

or

as grazing

to the

property

as

a

land and

indicated that there was nothing in between the two valuations:
He is of the opinion that the highest and best use of
the property prior to the excavation made thereon by
Defendant, Harry Thorsen, was as a subdivision or
mountain lot development.
That was the highest and
best use then and there were no other uses available
for the land except for grazing
(See paragraph 4,
Affidavit of Ken Esplin attached as E ) .
The valuation based upon the property by Ken Esplin as a
16

subdivision or mountain lot development was $12,000.00 per lot
with ten lots damaged at 50% leaving the value of each of the ten
lots at $6,000.00.

The Supreme Court, in its opinion attached as

C, specifically rejected said valuation in its prior opinion.
On the other hand, Mr. Esplin testified that in terms of market
value for grazing purposes for which he acknowledges, the only
other alternative that the fair market value of the property was
worth $100.00 per acre.

Gooseberry Estates, as a basis for their

Motion for Summary Disposition has alleged that the critical
figures to look at was the $1,250.00 amount which the Court
determined was the agreed amount prior to the damage and to
offset

said

amount

by

the

value

of

the

land

for

grazing

purposes.

To do so, would allow a complete contradiction in the

testimony

of Ken Esplin who supplied

the evidence

for whom

Gooseberry Estates rely.
In other words, it is the relative values of the property
which are critical before and after the cleaning of the ditch.
If the Court relies on the $1,250.00 figure, it must also rely on
the basis for which said figure was arrived.

In other words, if

Ken Esplin testifies at trial that the value of the property
prior to the damage done by the ditch was $1,250.00 based upon
its use for agricultural purposes, it is difficult to image, and
there

is no

testimony

in the record or evidence
17

to draw a

conclusion, but is contrary to one's common sense if the property
was useful for agricultural purposes before the ditch was cleaned
how the property, after the cleaning of the ditch, could not be
used

for

agricultural

purposes

encompassed by the ditch.

other

than

that

acreage

Therefore, the only diminution in

value would be the small strip of land for which the ditch
actually encompasses.

Counsel for Gooseberry in their Motion for

Summary Disposition as well as in their Motion for Re-assessment
of Damages asserts that Ken Esplin meant the $1,250.00 figure was
based upon the land's value as a subdivision.

However, Esplin's

testimony does not establish that the $1,250.00 figure was based
on

anything

other

than

the value

of

land

for

agricultural

purposes.
In short, the appraiser for Harry Thorsen has testified that
the cleaning of the ditch did not diminish the value of the
property.

The appraiser for Gooseberry Estates, after setting

out the three categories of figures arrived at, also demonstrates
that there was only a very minimal amount of diminution of value
in the property since this Court has rejected the valuation based
upon subdivision lots which Esplin valued at $12,000.00.
If the second category of figures is accepted by the Court of
$1,250.00, one would be led to the same conclusion that if the
property could be used for agricultural purposes prior to the
18

cleaning

of

the

ditch,

then

it

also

could

be

used

for

agricultural purposes subsequent to the cleaning of the ditch.
Likewise, assuming the difference in values of the property as
used for grazing purposes, one would also have to conclude that
the market value of the property prior to the damage was for
grazing purposes as well as subsequent to the injury to the land
and, consequently, the same conclusion is reached that Thorsen is
only

liable

for

the

damages

arising

out

of

the

acreage

encompassed by the ditch itself with a set off of the acreage
encompassed by the easements.
Consequently,

in light of the evidence, and the record

before the Court, the proper resolution of this matter is to
value the pre-injury market value of the property at $1,250.00 as
previously found by the Court and to award damages only for that
portion of the property which has been completely destroyed which
the Court has determined to be, at most, 1.8 acres (3,150 feet
long

times

easement.

15

feet wide) less the

area

encompassed

by the

(See Thorsen, at 1247.) Particularly in light of the

fact that whether one values the pre-market value based upon its
use as agricultural purposes or as grazing purposes, there can be
no diminution in value other than the area actually encompassed
by the ditch itself.
POINT II
19

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THE SIZE
OF THE PROPERTY THAT WAS DAMAGED.
In order for Gooseberry to establish on reassessment of
damages that all 33 proposed lots were damaged, Gooseberry would
have to completely impeach the testimony of their own appraiser,
Ken Esplin, persuade the Court to over-rule a specific finding it
had

previously

made

[for

which

counsel

for

Gooseberry

specifically drafted after the trial and included in its Findings
of Fact signed by the Court] and finally carry the burden of
persuasion on reassessment of damages to get the Court to make
findings and enter a judgment without any additional evidence
addressing

the

issue

and

get

the

Court

to

rule

in

direct

contravention of Gooseberry's own appraiser's testimony.
Based upon the clear and unequivocal testimony and evidence
before

the District Court, the outer

limits of the property

damaged can easily be ascertained by the testimony and evidence
produced.

Upon reassessment of damages, the District Court found

that all 33 lots were damaged.

The finding by the Court is not

supported by the evidence and in fact, contradicts the testimony
of the appraiser on which the Court relies.

At trial, Ken

Esplin, appraiser for Gooseberry Estates, testified as follows:
Now after taking into consideration the canal that
has gone through there, I feel that there are 10 lots
that are badly damaged, there are some others that
are damaged, but 10 of the lots are very badly
damaged. I think that they have decreased in value
20

by 50% or $6,000 per lot for a diminution because of
that canal at $60,000, leaving an after value of
$338,656* (Transcript page 323, emphasis added).
Ken Esplin also testified as it relates to the 10 lots as
follows:
Q: That in your letter addressed to Ken in the first
paragraph, don't you say that you are doing it on the
basis of nine lots that were damaged?
A: Well, that's a topographical error. If it says
nine, it is the ten lots that were damaged.
Q:

Ten lots that were damaged?

A:
Yes, definitely.
In fact, there are about 15
that are damaged. I figure that ten of that 15 or 16
that were damaged severely enough to be damaged by
50% and they are the only that I have drawn attention
to. There are several reasons for that:
There are two of those lots that already have
enough impairment with the power line running over
them, that they are damaged down to that figure
before and I haven't given any value to that. There
are reasons why I only use ten instead of the total
number that the canal goes through. (Transcript, page
330).
The trial Court prior to the first appeal
formula

offered

damages to award.

by Mr. Esplin in determining

accepted the

the amount of

Mr. Esplin testified that nine or ten lots

were damaged to 50% of their value or $6,000.

In so ruling, the

Court entered a Finding of Fact which was drafted by counsel for
Gooseberry that reads as follows:
The Court finds that there are nine (9) lots which
were totally destroyed and the Court fixes the value
of $6,000 and their condition at the time of the
21

aforesaid advance and not in the condition that they
would have become upon full development, but rather,
upon the basis of improvements done upon these lots
up to the time the defendant . . . (Paragraph 11
Amended Findings of Fact, Addendum F ) .
The issue of whether the damage extended to more than the
nine lots was never appealed by Gooseberry Estates nor was it
addressed by this Court.

Further, it is clear from the opinion

of this Court that all references to the extent of damages and
whether the damages assessed were appropriate, related only to
the nine lots.

Specifically, this Court states in its opinion

that there was no evidence in the record to support that nine
lots were completely destroyed which by implication would mean
that the damages were either less than 50% total destruction or
that the injured property encompassed less than the nine lots but
regardless, the Court set the outer

limits of the potential

damage to Gooseberry.
Upon Motion

for Reassessment

of Damages, as one

reads

carefully the Affidavit of Ken Esplin, there is no additional
evidence

presented

to the

Court

to

even

form

a basis

for

778consideration of damages extending beyond the nine lots.
The only assertion made with regard to whether the damages
should extend outside- of the nine lots is encompassed in the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities on Motion for Reassessment
of Damages which was supplied by Gooseberry's counsel as part of
22

their arguments which not only fails to constitute evidence for
which the Court can rely, but further, is directly contrary to
the testimony of their own witness, Ken Esplin, and the Findings
of Fact drafted by Gooseberry's counsel themselves•
Yet, the Court in its Ruling on Reassessment of Damages,
somehow not only awards damages for the nine lots previously
determined to be damaged but arbitrarily awards a Judgment for
damage to some 24 lots never before considered by the Court prior
to reassessment of damages.
In addition, the Court determines that the 24 lots are
damaged to the extent of 50% of their value.

The error the

District Court has made in so ruling is that the only evidence
before the Court as to a 50% reduction in value is specifically
limited to the ten lots as testified to by Ken Esplin and who
specifically
undamaged.

testifies

that

the

remaining

24

lots

were

As one looks to the evidence presented to the Court

by way of testimony and Affidavit and particularly in light of
Gooseberry

Estates1

own

appraiser,

the outer

limit

of

the

property involved or damaged would be the ten lots referred to by
Ken Esplin, which can even be narrowed further by the Court's
finding that the nine lots had been damaged.
Within the confines of the nine

lots which received some

degree of damage, one must consider the extent for which the
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Thorsens should be liable for any damage thereto.
This Court clearly found that the Thorsens were entitled to
an

easement

across

the

property

and with

any

easement

the

Thorsens had the right to clean the ditch and in fact, had the
obligation to Gooseberry to maintain the ditch to avoid water
leaking onto the Gooseberry property,
Thompson on Property, Easements, Section 428 (1980) states:
An easement involves the right to repair, and this
necessarily includes the right to go upon the land of
the servient owner for that purpose. The nature of
the easement determines what the dominant owner may
do in the way of repairing his easement. Thus, where
the servient tenement does not in its normal
condition support the easement but artificial
improvements are the basis of the easement the
dominant tenement owner has the right to maintain
those conditions, so long as such repair does not
increase the burden or unduly interfere with the
rights of the servient tenement. Private easements
with right of way must be maintained by the owner of
the dominant estate.
. . . Also, the grantee of a right-of-way may break
up the soil, level irregularities, fill up
depressions, blast rocks and remove impediments . .
If one has the right-of-way for ditch purposes, he
has the incidental right to enter upon the premises
for repair and maintenance at the time and places,
and to the extent necessary.
. . . The right-of-way for a ditch includes the right
to maintain it, which confers the right to make
repairs and the right of ingress and egress with
space therefore as contingency may show.
This Court found as set out in its opinion attached as
24

Addendum C that Thorsen's retained an easement for the
across

the Gooseberry

property.

This Court

further

ditch
found,

however, that "Thorsen greatly exceeded the mere cleaning of the
ditch and amounted to a substantial widening and deepening of the
ditch."

(See Addendum C ) .

Defendants' purpose in citing the

law as it relates to easements is not to raise issue or to
contest the finding by this Court that Thorsen exceeded his right
to clean and maintain the ditch but rather, raises the issue for
purposes

of

proximate

cause.

The

allegations

asserted

by

Gooseberry against Thorsen are in the nature of tort in that they
have alleged Thorsen entered onto their property and willfully
exceeded his right to maintain the easement by widening and
deepening the ditch.
A well accepted principle of tort law is that a defendant is
only liable for those damages which are proximately caused by the
defendantf s actions.
As with any tort, the tort-feasor is not liable for every
potential consequence resulting from his action but only damages
which are proximately caused by his actions:
The law is clear that a person who commits a tort is
not liable for all of the consequences of his
tortious activities simply because those consequences
can be traced to his activity.
One liabilitylimiting principle which has been accepted by the
Court is the doctrine of proximate cause.
A
statement frequently found in tort cases in which a
recovery for damages is sought is that the act or
25

admission of the defendant upon which the damages are
predicated must have been the proximate, as
distinguished from the remote cause of injury.
Another common statement is that damages may be
recovered against a tort-feasor for, or only for, the
natural, direct and proximate consequences of his
wrongful act or admission.
22 Am Jur. 2nd Damages Section 81.
As per the prior opinion of this Court, it was recognized
that Thorsen had an easement across the Gooseberry property at
the location the ditch, which the subject of this litigation, is
located.

In accord with the authorities cited supra, Thorsen had

a right and obligation to maintain the ditch.

The fact that

Thorsen had an easement across the property meant that at least
in terms of the building of a subdivision on the property meant
that the subdivision in essence would have to be built around the
easement.

Condominiums could not be built across the easement

nor could garages be built on the ditch.

Car pads could not be

built through the ditch which would impair Thorsen!s easement.
Fences could not be built so as to impede Thorsenfs right to use
and maintain the ditch.
Admittedly this Court has found that Thorsen exceeded his
right to clean and maintain the ditch and consequently, the Court
found that the ditch had been widened to 15 feet wide and 3,150
feet long occupying 1.08 acres.

The easement owned by Thorsen

and recognized by the Court is contained in the 1.08 acres.
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However, once one gets outside of the corporal physical 1.8 acres
encompassed by the ditch, the question of any damage because one
of proximate cause.
The text book example frequently used is the situation in
which a dwelling starts on fire and spreads to adjoining houses
and the question becomes whether the guilty party is liable for
every consequence arising from the fire or is there a some point
in which the tort becomes to removed from the injury that it will
be held not to have been proximately caused by the starting of
the fire.

As one expands the example with the fire from the

immediate house to adjoining houses and then to the next row of
houses and so on and then once the fire has been put out, are
persons who were outside the actual fire allowed to claim smoke
damage and those parties outside the smoke damage whether they
can claim injury because their view of adjoining property is not
aesthetically pleasing. The point to be made is that at some
point a line must be drawn as to those injuries proximately
caused by a defendant's tort.
As is the case with a fire, a line can be drawn at the point
in which the fire has been extinguished, so is it with the case
at hand that the actual physical injury can be drawn by the
parameters set by the Supreme Court of 15 feet by 3,150 feet
minus the acreage encompassed by the easement.
27

Once outside of

the 15 foot path of the ditch, the injury then becomes a question
of aesthetics.
Some of the facts which weigh against Gooseberry's assertion
that this property cannot be subdivided due to the ditch is that
the record is very clear that the same parcel of property also
contains a second ditch referred to as the "upper B ditch" or the
"B ditch extension" which also runs through the property which is
similar in size for which plaintiffs recognize the subdivision
would also have to be built around.
Light

easement

consists

of

which

large

There is a Utah Power &

runs perpendicular

towers

and

to

transmission

through the property in question.

the

ditch which

lines which

runs

In addition, the fact that

Thorsen had the easement for the irrigation ditch would require
any subdivision to be designed so as to not interfere with the
ditch.
As one considers the issue of proximate

cause, a valid

question in terms of aesthetics would be what if Thorsen had dug
the

ditch

on

his

own

property

which

abuts

the

Gooseberry

property, would Gooseberry then be able to recover damages from
Thorsen on the basis that the subdivision could not be built
because the ditch on the Thorsens property is not aesthetically
pleasing to adjoining homeowners.

The point to be made is that

once one is outside of the actual acreage encompassed by the
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ditch, the damages become too remote and uncertain as to be
proximately caused by defendant's actions.
CONCLUSION
The outer limits in terms of the value and quantity of the
property damaged were set by this Court and supported by the
clear evidence of the record that as an outer limit, nine lots
potentially received some degree of damage and that the value of
the property prior to the injury was $1,250 per acre.

The Court

further found that there was no evidence that the lots were
totally destroyed and instructed the District Court to find the
damage by determining the market value of the property before and
after the injury and apply it to that portion of the nine lots
which the Court found to be damaged.

As one applies the formula

set by the Supreme Court, the conclusion which is most in accord
with the facts and evidence and in light of this Court's prior
opinion, Gooseberry is entitled to recover at most damages for
the 15 foot strip, 3,150 feet long which occupies 1.08 acres less
the easement, at a market value of $1,250 per acre and judgment
/7

should be entered accordingly.
DATED this 2nd day of Marchf 19&&/.

FREDERICK A. JACKMAN~ "
Attorney for Harry Thorsen
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ADDENDA
B
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ADDENDUM

"B"

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *

HARRY THORSEN,
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsMARKAY JOHNSON, et al.,
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al. ,
Plaintiffs,

:

Civil No. 8461

-vsHARRY THORSEN and DONALD
GATES,
Defendants.

)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This matter came on before the Court on the Motion of
Plaintiffs Gooseberry Estates ("Plaintiffs") to reassess damages
against

Defendant Harry Thorsen

("Defendant") based upon the

Decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Case No.
18960;
The

Plaintiffs

having

moved

for

a

new

Judgment

reassessing damages and having supported the same with affidavits
concerning value of the land immediately before and immediately
after

the

dredging

of the trench

on

Plaintiffs1

land; said

affidavits having declared under oath that the maximum value of
the land damaged immediately after the injury inflicted upon the
Plaintiffs'

land

by

Defendant was

$100 • 00 per

acre

and the

affidavits not having been countered, contradicted or otherwise

contested by the Defendant; and the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah in the captioned case at 745 P.2d p. 1246 having determined
that the expert testimony for both the Plaintiffs and Defendant
fixed the value of the land immediately prior to the damage at
$1,250.00 per acre; and the Court having viewed the premises,
considered the evidence in the case at the time of trial and
based upon such view of the premises, the evidence of trial, and
the affidavits submitted by the parties, and being fully advised
in the premises now makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

An area which the Court viewed and which had been

surveyed by licensed

surveyors into nine

proposed

in a subdivision, each tract having an

to be

lots

(9) separate tracts

acreage of 1.53 acres or a total of 13.77 acres, suffered such
damage that it is totally useless for any purpose except grazing.
The

13.77

acres

having

a

value

of

$1,250.00

per

acre

or

$17,212.50 prior to the damage inflicted by the Defendant has
value

after

the

damage

of

$100.00

per

acre

therefore, the Plaintiffs have been damaged

or

$1,377.00;

in the amount of

$15,835.50 for the 13.77 acres.
2.

There remained 24 surveyed parcels of 1.53 acres

per parcel or 36.72 acres which suffered damage to the extent of
one-half of its prior value at $1,250.00 per acre or $45,900.00,
for total damage to the 36.72 acres of $22,950.00.
3.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have suffered

total damages of $38,785.00.
2

The Court orders that the Judgment of $38,785.00 shall
bear interest at the statutory rate of twelve (12%) per cent per
annum

from October

12, 1982, the original

date of entry of

Judgment, until satisfied.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes
the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

The lands of Plaintiffs, as adjudicated by the

Supreme Court, was subjected to waste committed on Plaintiffs1
property and Plaintiffs are entitled to damages as decided by the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Case No. 18960, reported at
745 P.2d at p. 1243.
B.
of

The Plaintiffs1 land has been damaged by the amount

$38,785.00 which constitutes the difference

in the values

approved by the Supreme Court in Case No. 18960 as the agreed
value of the land immediately prior to the damage and the value
of the land as determined by this Court immediately after the
damage.
C.
amount

of

The Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the

reassessed

damages

from

October

12, 1982

at the

statutory rate of 12% per annum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs be awarded
their costs in the District Court but not costs of this appeal.
CfED~~this 22nc

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Fredrick A. Jackman of
Jackman
East,

and Johnson, Attorneys

Suite

300, Orem, Utah

for Defendant, 1327 South 800
(84058), by

U.S. regular mail,

postage prepaid, this 22nd day of June, 1988.

/S/ Ken ChzKborlain
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *

HARRY THORSEN,

)

Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT

-vsMARKAY JOHNSON, et al.,
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, e t

al.,

Plaintiffs,

:

C i v i l No. 8461

-vsHARRY THORSEN and DONALD
GATES,
Defendants.

)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This matter came on before the Court on the Motion of
Plaintiffs Gooseberry Estates ("Plaintiffs") to reassess damages
against Defendant Harry Thorsen based upon the Decision of the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Case No. 18960;
The

Plaintiffs

having

moved

for

a

new

Judgment

reassessing damages and having supported the same with affidavits
concerning value of the land immediately before and immediately
after

the dredging

of the trench

on

Plaintiffs1

land; said

affidavits having declared under oath that the maximum value of
the land damaged immediately after the injury inflicted upon the
Plaintiffs'

land

by

Defendant was

$100.00 per

acre and the

affidavits not having been countered, contradicted or otherwise

contested by the Defendant and the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah in the captioned case at 745 P.2d p. 1246 having determined
that the expert testimony for both the Plaintiffs and Defendant
fixed the value of the land immediately prior to the damage at
$1,250.00 per acre and the Court having viewed the premises,
considered the evidence in the case at the time of trial and
based

upon

the

evidence

at

trial, the

Court's view

of the

premises, and the affidavits submitted by the parties and the
Court

being

advised

in the premises and

having

entered

its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore;
IT
should

IS

be and

HEREBY
hereby

ORDERED

AND ADJUDGED

are awarded Judgment

that

Plaintiffs

in the amount of

$38,785.00 as damages, to bear interest at the statutory rate of
twelve

(12%) per

cent per annum from the original

entry of

Judgment which was October 12, 1982.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Plaintiffs be awarded Judgment
for their costs in the District Court but not in the Supreme
Court.

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED a full, true and correct copy of the foregoinc
Judgment on Fredrick A. Jackman of Jackman and Johnson, Attorneys
for

Defendant,

1327

South

800

East,

Suite

300,

Orem, Utafc

(84058), by U.S. regular mail, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of
June, 1988.
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ADDENDUM "C"
COURT'S OPINION ON FIRST APPEAL

grounds and a general verdict is returned,
we will affirm if the jury properly could
have found for the prevailing party on any
of the theories comprehended by the general verdict. E.g., Barson v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984)
(citing Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v.
Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301-02 (Utah 1982)).
[3] The errors that Cambelt raises on
appeal all relate to Cambelt'a theory that
Cambelt and Dalton entered into an oral
contract under which Dalton would act as a
subcontractor. Dalton's defense and his
counterclaim were based on the theory that
he did not contract to construct the storage
tank support platform, but, instead, agreed
only to provide Cambelt with a crew. Dalton claimed that he did not take any responsibility for supervising the job or assuring that the platform was built in any
particular manner.
At trial, oral testimony by Dalton fully
supported his theory of the case. Cambelt's testimony contradicted it. The jury's
verdict rejecting Cambelt's claims and
awarding Dalton some $35,000 in damages
is entirely consistent with its having accepted Dalton's testimony and rejected
Cambelt's as to the nature of the relationship between the parties. The resolution
of this factual dispute is a matter we leave
to the jury. We cannot say that the evidence on this issue "so clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the outcome of the case." E.A. Strout Western
Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons,
Inc., 665 P.2d at 1322 (citing Ute-Cal Land
Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d
1240 (Utah 1980)). The burden on an appellant to establish that the evidence does not
support the jury's verdict and the factual
findings implicit in that verdict under such
a circumstance is quite heavy. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict, and we will not overturn
that verdict when it is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Von
1. In Scharf v. BMG Corp., we stated this standard of review as it then applied with respect to
findings of fact entered in a judge-tried civil
matter. The promulgation of Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a), which mandates that a trial

Hake v. Thomas, Wb V.za 766, 769 (Utah
1985). "To successfully attack the verdict,
an appellant must marshall all the evidence
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to that verdict, the
evidence is insufficient to support it." Id.
(citing Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)); > Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573,
577 n. 3 (Utah 1985). Therefore, the general verdict in favor of Dalton is sustainable
without regard to whether errors may have
been committed with respect to other issues also submitted to the jury. Barson v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d at 835.
The verdict is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
HALL, C.J., STEWART, Associate
C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.
HOWE, Justice (concurring).
I reluctantly concur, recognizing that the
majority opinion in Barson v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984), to
which opinion I dissented, announced the
rule that a general verdict will be sustained
if any one of the theories or defenses advanced by the prevailing party and on
which the jury could have relied in finding
for the prevailing party was not infected
with error. In the instant case, it is impossible for us as a reviewing court to know
(1) whether the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Dalton because they found that he
did not enter into a contract with Cambelt
to construct the platform, but instead had
only agreed to provide Cambelt with the
crew, or (2) whether the jury found in favor
of Dalton because even though he had entered into a contract with Cambelt, he had
no liability for the collapse of the platform
because it fell due, in whole or part, to
some fault on the part of Cambelt. The
trial court admitted evidence of contributory negligence by Cambelt over its objection that contributory negligence was not a
judge's findings of fact "shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous," alters this standard
somewhat in judge-tried cases. Still, the standard has continuing validity in regard to a jury's
factual findings.

aeiense to its action based upon breach of
warranty. After having admitted that evidence, the trial court refused to give to the
jury any instructions on the law in this
state on contributory negligence and comparative negligence, even though the defendant submitted proposed instructions on
that subject. Both the admission of such
evidence and the refusal to give such instructions are Cambelt's major assignments of error on this appeal.
We now refuse to consider the propriety
of the trial court's action, indulging in the
presumption that the general verdict was
reached by the jury on the ground that
there was no construction contract between
the parties, a defense to which the claimed
errors do not pertain. As expressed in my
dissenting opinion in Barson v. Squibb,
supra, I would not follow such practice in
our appellate review for the reasons discussed and based upon the authority cited
therein.

Harry THORSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Markay JOHNSON, and Bryce Johns*
individually, and Markay Johnson a
Bryce Johnson, dba Gooseberry 1
tates, a partnership, Defendants a
Respondents.
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, a partnernh
consisting of Tokaco Enterprises (itn«
a family partnership consisting of W
liam T. Gardner and his children W
liam Todd Gardner, Karl Ann Gardnc
and Corrina Ann Gardner), Latig
Inc., a corporation; Tell W. Gardru
Bryce Johnson; Markay Johnson at
Leonard V. Elfervig, all dba Goosebe
ry Estates, a Utah Partnership, Plait
tiffs and Respondents,
v.
Harry THORSEN and Donald Gates,
Defendants and Appellants.

For what little consolation it may be to
Cambelt, if the jury strictly followed the
No. 18960.
instructions given them, any contributory
Supreme Court of Utah.
negligence or fault of Cambelt should not
Nov. 5, 1987.
have influenced their verdict. The instructions made it clear that if they found that
Cambelt delivered plans and specifications
Landowner brought action agains
to Dalton which were part of the agreedownstream user for damages to propose*
ment between them, and Dalton failed to
real estate development caused when down
follow them and thereby constructed a stream user dredged inactive irrigatior
faulty and defective platform, they should ditch which coursed through development
return a verdict in favor of Cambelt. Con- The Sixth District Court, Sevier County
tributory negligence or fault on the part of Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment in favoi
Cambelt was not mentioned as a factor of owner. The downstream user appealed
they should consider.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that
(1) evidence supported finding that down
stream user exceeded and abused right to
enter upon owner's land to clean ditch and
that he was liable for damages, and (2)
(o fKfVNUMIUSVS!fM>
damages found were based upon erroneous
measure.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.
Zimmerman, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result.
Durham, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.

Evidence supported finding that downstream user of irrigation water exceeded
and abused his right to enter upon another's land to clean irrigation ditch and that
he was thus liable for damages; dredging
amounted to substantial widening and
deepening of ditch whereby large number
of trees were uprooted and excessive
amount of earth and rocks excavated.
2. Damages «=>138
Generally measure of damages for injury to real property is difference between
value of property immediately before and
immediately after injury.
3. Waters and Water Courses <3=>247U)
Damages to proposed real estate development when downstream user dredged inactive irrigation ditch which coursed
through development were arrived at based
upon erroneous measure; there was no evidence supporting trial court's finding that
lots had a fair market value of $6,000 before ditch was enlarged or that ditch totally
destroyed land, and expert's appraisal was
based on assumption that no one had lawful irrigation ditch easement through lots,
which was an erroneous assumption.
Norman H. Jackson, Richfield, for appellants.
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for respondents.
HOWE, Justice:
This is an appeal from a judgment in
favor of Gooseberry Estates, a partnership,
against Harry Thorsen and Donald Gates
(hereinafter Thorsen) for damages to a proposed real estate development in Sevier
County caused when Thorsen dredged an
inactive irrigation ditch which coursed
through the development.

ditch had long been abandoned, that another ditch had been established in another
location to carry Thorsen's water, and that
he did the dredging for the sole purpose of
preventing the use of Gooseberry's land for
a planned subdivision to which he, as a
nearby landowner, was opposed. The case
was tried before the court without a jury,
and the trial judge made a personal inspection of the property. In entering judgment
in favor of Gooseberry, the trial court
made findings of fact which are not clear
as to whether the court found that the
ditch had been abandoned prior to the
dredging. However, at the oral argument
of this case before this Court, counsel for
Gooseberry admitted that the trial court
did not find an abandonment and that Thorsen had an easement through Gooseberry's
land for the ditch.
Nevertheless, in other findings of fact,
the court found that the dredging by Thorsen greatly exceeded the mere cleaning of
the ditch and amounted to a substantial
widening and deepening of the ditch whereby a large number of trees were uprooted
and an excessive amount of earth and
rocks were excavated. Specifically, the
court found that the ditch "should not have
been cleaned or dug up in the manner that
it was and if there had been any right at all
it would have been merely the right of
running a plow through the area, the right
merely to handclean the ditch and it would
have delivered more water under the circumstances than it will at the present
time." The evidence fully supports the
findings of fact and conclusions of the
court that Thorsen exceeded and abused
his right to enter upon Gooseberry's land
to clean the ditch and that he is liable for
damages.

[1] Thorsen was a downstream user of
the irrigation water and contended that he
had the right to enter upon Gooseberry's
property for the lawful purpose of cleaning

[2,3] Thorsen further contends that the
damages found against him were excessive
and based upon an erroneous measure. Although there are exceptions and variations,1 generally the measure of damages

1. Another measure of damages, discussed in the
dissent, is the cost of restoring the damaged
trees. In Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 Utah 2d 77,

498 P.2d 648 (1972), we refused to employ that
measure of damages where lilacs growing
around a rental unit were destroyed. We held

between the value ot the property immediately before and immediately after the injury (often referred to as the "Diminution in
Value" rule). Pehrson v. Saderup, 28
Utah 2d 77, 498 P.2d 648 (1972); Brereton
v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 P.2d 3 (1967);
22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 132. The trial
court apparently endeavored to apply this
measure of damages when it announced:
The court finds that there were nine lots
which were totally destroyed, and the
court sets the value of $6,000 per lot and
in its present condition and not being
improved based upon the work up to that
time; the plaintiffs are awarded a judgment of $54,000. That's based upon
$6,000 per lot for the nine lots.
This analysis is flawed in two respects.
There was no evidence that the "lots" had
a fair market value of $6,000 before Thorsen enlarged the ditch, and there was no
evidence that the ditch totally destroyed
nine "lots." The following factual background is helpful to an understanding of
why the trial court erred.
On May 14, 1979, Gooseberry entered
into a contract with Bryce Johnson to purchase from him 94.47 acres of land for a
total of $66,750 or $706.57 per acre. Johnson had acquired the 94.47 acres on July
30, 1978, for the same price. Gooseberry
contemplated subdividing 50.59 acres of
that tract into a development of thirtythree lots, containing 1.53 acres per lot.
During the seventeen months which
elapsed from May 14, 1979, when Gooseberry purchased the land, to October of
1980, when Thorsen damaged the land, no
improvements were placed upon the property by Gooseberry. A preliminary subdivision plat was prepared, but a final plat had
not been approved or recorded. Gooseberry expended $8,400 for surveying, mapping, and platting. It also expended $7,100
in an attempt to drill a well to provide
culinary water for the lots. Adequate water was not found. At the time of trial,

chase oi the property. uooseDerry put on
testimony that the projected cost of the
improvements was $171,125, but this did
not include a central sewage system which
the county later required.
The $6,000-per-lot damage found by the
lower court was apparently based on testimony given by an appraiser, Kenneth Esplin, that if and when the subdivision was
approved and recorded, water was made
available, and the improvements were in
place, the lots should sell for $12,000 each.
He opined that ten of the proposed lots
were damaged so as to reduce their potential value by 50 percent, or to $6,000 each.
Esplin admitted that he was not very familiar with the market for mountain lots in
Sevier County where the property was located. He based his opinion on sales made
in the Cedar City and Fairview areas in
other counties. Counsel for Thorsen repeatedly objected to Esplin's testimony on
the grounds that it was speculative, conjectural, and irrelevant.

that it would be unreasonable to there employ
that measure, but recognized that it might be
reasonable in a case where an ornamental tree
was damaged on a residential lot. In the instant case, costs of restoration would be unrea-

sonable since the value of an acre of similar
land would be $1,250 and restoration costs
would exceed $100,000 on the 1.08 acres which
Thorsen damages.

The difficulty with Esplin's testimony,
and the court's judgment which was based
upon it, is that at the time Thorsen inflicted
damage upon the realty, the property was
in a pristine state exactly the same as when
it had been purchased seventeen months
earlier. It is true that Gooseberry had
expended $15,500 in preparations to improve it with the expectation that some day
it would become a subdivision of mountain
lots. However, before this expectation
could be realized, Gooseberry would have
to finish paying for the land, develop a
culinary water supply approved by the
health department, and install a central
sewage system. Then, county planning
and zoning approval of the final plat, together with approval by the County Commission, would have to be granted. Thereafter, financing for hundreds of thousands
of dollars worth of improvements would
have to be obtained. When the improve-
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ready and willing to pay $12,000 for each
of the thirty-three lots would have to be
found.
In viewing Gooseberry's land as a completed subdivision, Esplin and the trial
court lost sight of the fact that the measure of damages is the diminution of the
fair market value of the property immediately following the infliction of the damage—not what the property may be worth
when and if substantial sums of money are
expended to turn it into an improved subdivision. In State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248,
291 P.2d 1028 (1956), a condemnation case
in which the jury was instructed to find the
fair market value of the property, we quoted with approval from Pennsylvania S. V.
R. Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 A. 468
(1889).
It is proper to inquire what the tract is
worth, having in view the purposes for
which it is best adapted, but it is the
tract, and not the lots into which it might
be divided, that is to be valued
The
jury are to value the tract of land and
that only. They are not to determine
how it could best be divided into building
lots, nor conjecture how fast they could
be sold, nor at what price per lot. A
speculator or investor, in deciding what
price he could afford to pay, would consider the chances and probabilities of the
situation as then actually existing. A
jury should do the same thing. They are
not to inquire what a speculator might be
able to realize out of a resale in the
future, but what a present purchaser
would be willing to pay for it in the
condition it is now in.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Colorado in Department of Highways v. Schulhoff, 167 Colo. 72, 445 P.2d 402, 405 (1968),
quoted the above passage from Pennsylvania S. V.R. Co. v. Cleary and restated the
same rule as follows:
It is proper to show that a particular
tract of land is suitable and available for
subdivision into lots and is valuable for
that purpose. It is not proper, however,
to show the number and value of lots as
separated parcels in an imaginary subdivision thereof. Stated differently, it is

improper iur uie jury u> consider an undeveloped tract of land as though a subdivision thereon is an accomplished fact.
Such undeveloped property may not be
valued on a per lot basis, the cost factor
clearly being too speculative.
By fixing the damages based on a completed, improved subdivision, the trial court
valued the land before it was damaged at
$3,921 per acre, whereas it had been purchased seventeen months earlier at $706.57
per acre. This amounts to a 450 percent
increase in value—without a single improvement to the realty. Significantly, appraiser Esplin testified that the remaining
43.88 acres of the 94.47 acres purchased by
Gooseberry (which were not going to be
subdivided) had a fair market value of
$1,250 per acre. This was exactly the same
value per acre ascribed to the entire 94.47acre tract by Thorsen's appraiser, Joseph
S. Stott Stott belonged to a firm which
had been marketing real estate in Sevier
County for seven years. Mountain subdivision lots had been advertised for sale and
listed with his agency. However, he testified, "in the years that I have been in the
business, we have yet to sell a mountain lot
out of our office."
Esplin's appraisal was also flawed because it was based on his assumption that
no one had a lawful irrigation ditch easement through the "lots." This was erroneous. As previously mentioned, at oral argument of this case before this Court,
counsel for Gooseberry Estates admitted
that the trial court did not find an abandonment and that Thorsen had an easement
for the irrigation ditch.
Additionally, while Esplin testified that
the ditch as enlarged by Thorsen would
reduce the potential value of any improved
lot from $12,000 to $6,000, he did not testify that the value of any of the proposed
lots was totally destroyed by the enlarged
ditch. To the contrary, he testified the
ditch diminished their potential value by 50
percent. Thus, there is no basis in the
evidence for the trial court's conclusion
that the value of the nine lots was totally
destroyed. The ditch, as widened and deepened by Thorsen, was fifteen feet wide.

The remainder of the proposed 1.53-acre
lots through which the ditch coursed was
undamaged2 and could be used at a minimum for grazing purposes. The entire
ditch occupied 1.08 acres (3,150 ft. long x
15 ft. wide). This would be the maximum
land which could have been "totally destroyed." It too assumes, contrary to the
admission of Gooseberry's counsel, that
Thorsen had no right at all to an easement.
Since the amount of damages found by
the trial court was arrived at by an erroneous method, we reverse the judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for reassessment of damages.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART,
Associate C.J., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in
the result):
I agree with Justice Durham's statement
of the law of damages. However, I agree
with the majority that the trial court made
several unjustified assumptions in fixing
the amount of damages. Therefore, I join
the majority in remanding the case for a
reassessment of damages. In making that
reassessment, I would hold that the trial
court should be guided by the broader damage principles discussed in Justice Durham's opinion.
DURHAM, Justice (concurring and
dissenting):

sure of damages if it does not exceed the
diminution in the market value.
Id. at 1120 (citations omitted). The opinion
correctly notes that the above standard is
not a rigid one and that "even when diminution in value is clearly the appropriate
measure of damages, evidence as to repair
costs is admissible for the purpose of helping (the fact finder] determine the loss of
value." Id. at 1121 (citations omitted).
In Brereton v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433
P.2d 3 (1967), this Court endorsed a flexible
rule particularly applicable for damages to
land associated with destruction of trees on
the realty.
When property has been damaged or
destroyed by a wrongful act, the desired
objective is to ascertain as accurately as
possible the amount of money that will
fairly and adequately compensate the
owner for his loss.
Because of the fact that any attempt
at unvarying uniformity in applying either [the diminution in value rule or the
separate value rule], a third rule, which
we believe to be the better considered
and more practical one, has been applied.
It gives the injured party the benefit of
whichever of the two rules will best
serve the objective hereinabove stated of
giving him reasonable and adequate compensation for his actual loss as related to
his use of his property
If he wants
to maintain a fruit orchard, a wood lot,
or even a primitive area, though his property may be more valuable if turned to
an industrial or residential purpose, that
should be his prerogative; and if it is
wrongfully destroyed or damaged, the
wrongdoer should pay for the actual
damage he caused.
Id. at 66, 67-68, 433 P.2d at 5-6.

I join the majority opinion in affirming
the judgment as to liability, but dissent
from its treatment of the damage question.
The measure of damages for permanent
injury to land and damage to trees was
recently treated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117
(Utah Ct.App.1987):
Generally, the measure of damages for
permanent injury to land is the difference in the market value of the land
immediately before and immediately after the injury, but if the land may be
restored to its original condition, the cost
of restoration may be used as the mea-

A few years later, in Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 Utah 2d 77, 498 P.2d 648 (1972), this
Court quoted with approval the following
language from Thatcher v. Lane Construction Co., 21 Ohio App.2d 41, 254 N.E.
2d 703 (1970):

2. We recognize that the ditch, as enlarged,
might possibly impair access to parts of the

proposed lots, but there was no evidence adduced on this subject.

tial to the planned use of property for a
homesite in accordance with the taste
and wishes of its owner, where not unreasonable and where such trees are destroyed by trespassers, the owner may
be awarded as damages the fair cost of
restoring his land to a reasonable approximation of its former condition, if
such restoration be practical, without
necessary limitation to diminution in market value of such land.
28 Utah 2d at 79, 498 P.2d at 650 (citing
Thatcher, 21 Ohio App.2d at 49, 254 N.E.2d
at 708). The Pehrson opinion goes on to
state what I believe to be a sound and just
rule: "In a determination of the appropriate measure of damages in this area, the
cardinal principles are flexibility of approach and full compensation to the owner,
within the overall limitation of reasonableness." Pehrson, 28 Utah 2d at 79, 498
P.2d at 650.
The trial court in this case found as fact
that defendant Thorsen "willfully and intentionally . . . [made] a massive, senseless,
purposeless ditch across [plaintiffs'] premises." A review of the numerous photographs in the record explains the finding
that the trial judge, after personal inspection of the land, was "shocked at the damage which was done to the premises . . .
and [had] grave doubts whether or not the
property . . . can ever be used for the purposes for which they [sic] were bought by
the Plaintiffs." The evidence showed that
more than two hundred mature pine trees
and one hundred and seventy cedars over
eight feet tall were uprooted by defendant.
Plaintiffs' experts testified that replacing
them would cost approximately $275 per
tree and that the trees on the lots were
extremely important to the development
and sale of the lots. Other testimony established that many lots would not even be
saleable without grading and reseeding at
a cost of $80,000 without replacing any
trees. In short, although disputed, there
was considerable evidence upon which the
trial court could rely in awarding $54,000.
In view of the malice that motivated this
destruction, I am not in the least troubled
by the flexible approach the trial judge

rule. In fact, I think he would have been
justified in using the restoration costs,
within some reasonable limit, as a measure
of damages. Fifty-four thousand dollars,
as compared to the cost of replacing the
destroyed trees (more than $100,000) seems
very reasonable to me. The majority's approach is, I believe, contrary to our case
law supporting the principle of full compensation within the overall limitation of reasonableness.
Finally, I note that Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-38-3 (1987), upon which plaintiffs apparently did not rely, provides for the trebling of civil damages against "any person
who cuts down . . . or otherwise injures
any tree . . . on the land of another person
. . . without lawful authority."

Karla KISHPAUGH (Kornmayer),
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Richard Bruce KISHPAUGH,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20423.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 6, 1987.
Natural father filed petition to modify
divorce decree to change custody. Maternal grandparents filed petition to obtain
guardianship over child. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder,
J., awarded custody to grandparents. Father appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) presumption favoring custody by natural parent was
rebutted and trial court was permitted to
base custody award solely on its determination of the child's best interests once it
found that all three requirements for rebuttal of presumption had generally been met,
viz., that no strong mutual bond exists be-

demonstrated willingness to sacrifice selfinterest for child, and that parent lacks sympathy for child; (2) the trial court was not
clearly erroneous in determining that the
natural-parent-presumption had been rebutted; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that child's best
interests required placement with grandparents.
Affirmed.
Stewart, Associate C.J., concurred in
the result.
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion in
which Hall, C.J., concurred.
1. Infants «=>19.3(5)
Existing-placement presumption, which
favors existing custody arrangement, must
be overcome by showing of changed circumstances before court may apply the
best-interest test to petition for change of
custody. (Per Zimmerman, J., with one
Justice concurring and one Justice concurring in the result.)

duauce concurring ana one Justice concur
ring in the result.)
4. Parent and Child «=»2(8)
Inference favoring custody award to
natural parent was rebutted when trial
court's findings, taken as a whole, generally
established that no strong mutual bond existed between natural parent and child, parent had not demonstrated willingness to
sacrifice own interests for child, and parent
lacked sympathy and understanding of
child. (Per Zimmerman, J., with one Justice
concurring and one Justice concurring in
the result.)
5. Parent and Child «=»2(8)
The trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that presumption favoring
custody by natural parent had been rebutted, in custody dispute between natural
father and maternal grandparents. (Per
Zimmerman, J., with one Justice concurring
and one Justice concurring in the result.)

6. Parent and Child «=»2(3.4, 3.7, 15)
2. Parent and Child <?»2(8)
The trial court did not abuse its discreIn the absence of strong showing re- tion and did not fail to follow appropriate
butting natural-parent presumption, which standards in determining that best interfavors custody by natural parent over cus- ests of child, who had cerebral palsy and
tody by nonparent, custody disputes will be severe hearing impairment that rendered
disposed of in accordance with natural-par- him functionally deaf, required granting of
ent presumption. (Per Zimmerman, J., custody to maternal grandparents, rather
with one Justice concurring and one Justice than to natural father; grandparents had
concurring in the result.)
developed warm and stable relationship
with child as result of having taken care of
3. Parent and Child «=>2(3.1, 8)
The trial court may base custody child for more than three years between
award, in dispute between parent and non- time of divorce and time when natural faparent, on its own determination of best ther decided to seek custody, and child
interests of child only if it finds that no preferred to live with grandparents. (Per
strong mutual bond exists between parent Zimmerman, J., with one Justice concurring
and child, that parent has not demonstrated and one Justice concurring in the result.)
willingness to sacrifice own interest and
welfare for child's, and that parent lacks
sympathy for and understanding of child
that is characteristic of parents generally;
Michael Z. Hayes and Ronald L. Dunn,
however, this rule does not have to be
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appelmechanically applied, and natural-parent
lant.
presumption is rebutted when the trial
court finds general lack of the above charJane Allen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
acteristics. (Per Zimmerman, J., with one and respondent.

ADDENDUM "D"
APPRAISAL OF KEN ESPLIN

APPRAISAL REPORT
ON
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES
FOR
KEN CHAMBERLAIN

REPORT BY ESPLIN-ROBISON REAL ESTATE SERVICES

Esplin-Robison Real Estate Services, Inc.
112 South Main, Cedar City, Utah 84720 (801)586-4435

Mr. Ken Chamberlain
Attorney-at-Law
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah

84701

Dear Mr. Chamberlain,
I have personally inspected and appraised the property identified as
Goodebery Estates near Salina, Sevier County, Utah, consisting of
94.49 acres as identified in this report. The purpose being to report to
you my opinion of the demunition of value of nine lots in Goosebery Estates
casued by the canal put through these lots.
Based on the examination and study made, I have formed an opinion that
on the date mentioned the property had a value of:
Land Value before Canal
Value after Canal
Difference

$448,656.00
388,656.00
$ 60,000.00

The following report presents a review of the appraisal and analysis of
the date along with other material on which the value was predicated.
Thank you for the privilege

N REAL ESTATE SERVICES
KWE:glg
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ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITING CONDITIONS
This appraisal has been based upon the following assumptions and limiting conditions:
That I assume no responsibility for matters legal in nature, nor do I
render any opinion as to the title which is assumed to be good. All
existing liens and encumbrances securing payment of money have been
disregarded and the property is appraised as though free and clear and
under responsible ownership and competent management.
This appraisal has been made from maps, legal descriptions, and data
furnished by the property owner which are assumed to be correct.
I believe the information contained in this report, which was furnished
by others, to be true and correct; however, no responsibility is assumed
for errors or omissions, or for information not disclosed which might
otherwise affect the feasibility and valuation estimate.
No soil reports concerning the subject property were available to the
appraiser. This valuation assumes that the soil conditions are adequate
to support standard construction consistent with the highest and best
use.
Possession of this repqrt, or a copy thereof, does not carry with it the
right of publication, nor may it be reproduced in whole or part, in any
manner, by any person, without the written consent of the appraiser.
Neither all nor any part of the contents of this report shall be conveyed to the public through advertising, public relations, news, sales,
or other media, without the written consent and approval of the author,
particularly as to the valuation conclusions, the identity of the appraiser, and of the firm with which I am connected.
I am prepared, but not required, to give testimony or attendance in
court by reason of this appraisal with reference to the property in
question unless additional arrangements are made therefore.

\*)

APPRAISAL REPORT

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY
Subject property is a 94.47 acre parcel of vacant land at the present time.
There has at one time been a portion of this land farmed. The property appraised
herein is platted and preliminarily approved as a subdivision.

LEGAL DESCRIPTION
All of Lot 4, Section 19, T22S, R2E, SLB&M, and all of Lot 1, Section 30,
T22S, R2E, SLB&M; also the Northerly 490.74 feet of Lot 2, Section 30, T22S,
R2E, SLB&M.
Containing 94.47 acres.

OSTENSIBLE OWNERSHIP
According to the official Sevier County records, as of April 1, 1982, title
to the property is held in the name of Victory Roy, under contract of sale to
Bryce Johnson.

PURPOSE AND EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE APPRAISAL
The purpose of this apprisal is to estimate the market value of the fee simple
title to the subject property, as of April 1, 1982. It is appraised as if free
of all liens, encumbrances and indebtedness...to determine the demunition of
value caused by a canal across the property.

DEFINITION OF MARKET VALUE
Market value is undetsood to be " . . .the highest price in terms of money which
the property will bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions
requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and
knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus." A
more complete definition of market value is incluedd in the addendum to this
report. By this specific reference it is made a part of this report.

DEFINITION OF HIGHEST AND BEST USE
Highest and best use is understood to mean the most profitable, likely,
legal use of a property. A more complete definition of highest and best use is
i n r l u d p r l i n t h p arlrlpnrinm t o t h n c r o n n r t
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CITY AND REGIONAL DATA
This property is located in a region known as the Intermountain West.
It includes all of Utah, as well as portions of Nevada, Wyoming, Colorado,
Idaho, and Arizona. The state of Utah has an estimated population of about
1,400,000. Approximately 80% of these reside in th largely urban area known
as the "Wasatch Front". This strip is located along a north-south line in
the valleys which nestle at the base of the westerly slopes of the Wasatch
Mountain Range between Santaquin on the south and Brigham City on the north.
Except for a few strategically located towns and small cities, the balance of
the state is relatively sparsely populated.

AREA DESCRIPTION
Subject property is located 6 miles south and slightly east of Salina, Utah.
Salina is the major stop on Interstate 70, which starts at Green River, Utah,
and has progressed as far as Salina. It is projected to go further west and
joint 1-15 at Cover Fort. It will be the fastest and best route through Southern
Utah. Salina is also one of the last large towns going south on Highway 89 to the
parks and into Arizona.
Because of these features, and the fact that several large corporations have
manufacturing plants in the area as well as several coal mines, Salina has
maintained a remarkably stable economy. This activity is coupled with the
agricultural and dairy herds to complete the present-day economy of the area.
Mining activity has slowed slightly but is expected to bounce back.
The future economics of the area should trend upwards as tourism along 1-70 begins
to make its influence felt in the area and motels and allied services should
begin to proliferate.
Salina has both rail and truck service. However, the nearest airport is a small
private strip, unattended and with tie-down facilities only. It is six miles
north. The nearest airport which is attended and has services is at Richfield,
Utah, about 20 miles to the southwest of Salina. Richfield is the county seat
of Sevier County. Salina has a population of 2,128 and Richfield about 6,225.
The county has a population of 15,552. All figures are approximate as they
came from the 1980 county figures and the 5-Counties organization research.
The altitude in the area is between 4,800 and 6,000. The rainfall ranges from
8 to 12 inches yearly and most crops are irrigated. The altitude of the
subject property is approximately 6,250 feet.

PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF THE APPRAISAL
The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the fair market unencumbered
fee value of the subject property.
The function of the appraisal is to be used as a value guide in financial
matters relating to the property.

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION
The problem involves the investigation of the real estate market in the area
to arrive at a current market value of the property similar in character,
to be used as a basis of comparison in arriving at a value indicative
of the subject land.
Businessmen, buyers, and sellers were contacted. County records of land sales
were investigated and interviews with knowledgeable persons regarding real
estate prices were made.
In addition the land owners and local realtors were interviewed as to values.
The problem in this appraisal is determining the demunition in value cause by a can
across the property.

SUMMARY OF APPRAISAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Property Appraised:

The property subject of this appraisal consists of
94.47 acres of which 50.59 have been platted into a
residential subdivsiion. The balance to remain open
meadow and farm.

Estate Appraised:

Full fee simple

Owned by:

Presently vested in Victor Roy, being sold under
contract to Bryce Johnson, contract dated June 1978.

Date appraisal Estimates
Are Applied:

April 1, 1982

Value Calculation:
Value calculated on a finished subdivision basis
Before (43.88 ac + 33
lots)
$448,656.00
Demunition Damage
(10 lots damaged 50%)
(60,000.00)
Total Damages
$ 60,000.o0
Rounded to
$ 60,000.00
Reaming Value after
Di fference

$388,656.00
$ 60,000.00

If these lots are not saleable because of the denuding of the strip, it may
cause the project to become unfeasible because of development costs compared
to return.

NEIGHBORHOOD DATA
Subject property is located appxoimately 6 miles south and slightly east of
Salina, Utah. This parcel of property is surrounded by agricultural properties,
both irrigated farm land and dry brush pasture and dry farm land. There is also
other subdivision development in the area.

SITE DATA
The property is a 94.47 acre parcel of land that is rectangular in shape and is
gently sloping from east to west and south to north. There is enough water with
this property to provide ample culinary water for the 33 proposed year round lots.
50.59 acres of the subject property have been platted into 33 lots. The remaining
43.88 acres are to remain open meadow and farm land.

DESCRIPTION OF THE IMPROVEMENTS
Improvements are not a factor in this appraisal as none are disturbed by the
advent of the canal and destruction of trees in instally same.

ZONING DATA
Subject property is presently zoned county agricultural.

ASSESSMENT AND TAX DATA
As of the effective date of this appraisal, for tax purposes, the realty included
in the appraisal is taxed as follows:
Serial No. 4-1-48-2 and 4-1-48-6
Market Valuation:
Land
Buildings
Personal Property
1981 Taxes

$4,500
none
none
$169.05

HIGHEST AND BEST USE
In estimating the highest and best use of this property, particular attention
was given to the four forces that create value; i.e., physical-environmental,
social, political-governmental, and economic. The site is well adapted physically
and environmentally for residential subdivision purposes because of its setting
and its proximity to Salina, Utah. Due to its orientation to the community and
other facilities and due to its physical characteristics, it is best suited,
physically, for a ranchette residential subdivision.

UTILITIES
The only utility available to the property at the present time is power from
Utah Power and Light, culinary water to come from a well on the property. A
sanitary sewer facility could be installed using septic tank and leach line
system. Telephone service is available from Utah Power and Light.

STREETS AND ACCESS
Subject property is accessable from a paved road that is maintained by
the state of Utah and Sevier County.

VALUE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
The appraisal process is based on three approaches to value. These
reflect the three investment alternatives available to participants in
the market. These are named the direct sales comparison approach, the
reproduction cost approach, and the income capitalization approach. In
the addendum to this report, a full explanation of each of the three
approaches of the final estimate of value are included. By specific reference, it is made a part of this report.

REPRODUCTION COST APPROACH
Not a factor as there are no improvements, building wise on the property.

DIRECT SALES COMPARISON APPROACH
In estimating the market value of the property by market comparison,
sales of other competing properties were sought in the market. Those
selected as most competative were selected as comparable sales. In adjusting these, several elements of comparability were considered, such
as the date of sales, the size and shape, physical characteristics,
highest and best use, sale conditions and location. The units of comparison are per lot and per acre. The market was searched for comparable sales.
The list that follows includes those that were concluded to be the most
applicable.

ADDENDUM

#1:
Grantor:
Grantee:
Date:
Size:
Price:
Remarks:

Willard M. Tucker
Ray L. Webb
Spring 1979
55.47 acres platted and engineered into a 42 l o t
subdivision. (2 lots reserved to seller)
$240,000.00 or $6,000.00 per Lot.
This sale was prior to any improvements other than
rough graded roads. This subdivision is known as
Fairview Heights.

e#2;
Grantor:
Grantee:
Date:
Size:
Price:
Remarks:

Ray L. Webb
Hal B. Jensen
July 20, 1981
0.930 acor, Lot 5, Fairview Heights Subdivision
$14,000.00 cash
This is the sale of a l o t in the subdivision that was
sold in sale #1.

e #3:
Grantor:
Grantee:
Date:
Size:
Price:
Remarks:

Ron Bangater
James L. Larsen
May 1980
0.920 acre (lot in Fairview Heights)
$11,000.00 cash
This sale was made before any of the improvements were
in and was a cash sale.

e #4:
Grantor:
Grantee:
Date:
Size:
Price:
Terms:
Remarks:

Acord Lales Mountain retreet
undisclosed
June 1982
6.6 Acres
$8,000.00
Contract sale 10% down balance over 7 years @ 12% int.
this lot had trees on approximately 3 acres of the site.
This sale is the sale of Lot 3-A in Acord Lakes Mountain
retreet.

e #5:
Grantor:
Grantee:
Date:
Size:
Price:
Remarks:

Acord Lakes Mountain Retreet Corp.
Roger Arensen
July 1982
5.51 acres Lot 213 Acord Lakes Subdivision
$4,000.00, cash,
The buyer in this case agreed to buy three other lots,
In addition this lot has very few trees on it.'

Sale #6:
Grantor:
Grantee:
Date:
Size:
Price:
Remarks:

Acord Lakes Mountain Retreet Corp
flpdisclQsid
April 1982
6.62 Acres (lot 172 Acord Lakes)
$3,000.00
There are no trees on thsi lot and it was a cash sale.

Sale #7:
There have been in the past year re-sales of three of the better
tree covered lots in the Acord Lakes Mountain Retreet. Two of these
lots sold for $11,000.00 Each, and one for $15,000.00.

Correlation of Sales:
Sale #1 indicates the value of an engineered and platted subdivision
in the market as apposed to raw land. This sale property is very similar
to the subject property in that the size is very close ot the platted
subdivision subject of this appraisal, it is in the county above Fairview
and the lots in this subdivision are similar in size to those in the
proposed Gooseberry Estates subdivision.
Sales 2 and 3 indicate the value of such lots with the improvements in
place. Sales 4 through six indicate the large difference there is between
lots with good tree cover and those that have few or no trees.
These sales indicate a reasonable value of $12,000.00 per lot for the
Gooseberry Estates lots in an improved state.

APPRAISAL EXPERIENCE QUALIFICATIONS AND A PARTIAL LIST OF CLIENTS:
Real estate broker licensed by the State of Utah since January 1970.
Association Manager and Designee Appraiser for the Federal Land Bank
of Berkley (Cedar City Office) 1960 to 1965
Indepent fee appraiser 1965 to present

PARTIAL LIST OF CLIENTS:
Review appraiser Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA #1099969)
First Security Bank of Utah NA
State Bank of Southern Utah
Walker Bank and Trust
Zion's First National Bank
Utah State Road Commission
Bureau of Public Roads
National Park Service
Federal Aviation Administration
Internal Revenue Service
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
Cedar City Corporation
St. George City
Springdale City
Kanab City
Parowan City
Salina City
Iron County School District
Sevier County School District
Millard County School District
Western Rock Products
Attornies:
Patric H. Fenton - Cedar City
Willard Bishop - Cedar City
Michael Park - Cedar City
Joseph E. Jackson - Cedar City
Ron Thompson - St. George
Jim Scarth - St. George
Michael Hughs - St. George
Frank Allen - St. George
Fay E. Reber - St. George
Philip Long Foremaster - St. George
J. Ralph Atkin - St. George

I have been qualified as an expert witness in the appraisal field and
testified in nine district courts in Utah and two in Nevada.
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DEFINITION OF MARKET VALUE

Market value is understood to be ". . .the highest price in terms of
money which the property will bring in a competitive and open market
under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller,
each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not
affected by undue stimulus."
Implicit in this definition is the consummation of sale as of a specified date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions
whereby:
1.

buyer and seller are typically motivated.

2.

both parties are well informed or well advised, and each
acting in what he considers his own best interest.

3.

a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market.

4.

payment is made in cash or its equivalent.

5.

financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the
community at the specified date and typical for the property
type in its local.

6.

the price represents a normal consideration for the property
sold unaffected by special amount and/or terms, services,
fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction.

DEFINITION OF HIGHEST AND BEST USE

The highest and best use of land has been described as ". . . that
reasonable and probable use that will support the highest present value
as defined, as of the effective date of the appraisal. Alternatively,
that use, from among reasonable, probable, and legal alternative uses
found to be physically possible, appropriately supported, financially
feasible, and which results in highest land value." ". . .It is to be
recognized that in cases where a site has existing improvements on it,
the highest and best use may yery well be determined to be different
from the existing use. Implied within these definitions is recognition
of the contribution of that specific use to community environment or to
community development goals in addition to wealth maximization of individual property owners. Also implied is that the determination of
highest and best use results from the appraiser's judgement and analytical skill, i.e., that the use determined from analysis represents an
opinion, not a fact to be found. In appraisal practice, the concept of
highest and best use represents the premise upon which value is based.
In the context of most probable selling price (market value) another
appropriate term to reflect highest and best use would be most probable
use. In the context of investment value, an alternative would be most
profitable.

Source: Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, compiled and edited by Byrl
N. Boyce, PhD., jointly sponsored by the American Institute of Real
Estate Appraisers and the Society of Real Estate Appraisers, published
by Ballinger Publishing Company of Cambridge, Massachusetts.

VALUE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
The appraisal process is generally based on three approaches to
value which, in turn, are based en various economic principles. The
first approach is the reproduction cost approach. It begins with an
estimate of the market value of the site, usually derived by direct
comparison with sales of similar sites. Next, an estimate of the reproduction cost new of the building improvements is completed. From
this is deducted depreciation which accrues from wear and. tear, changing standards of design and plan, and neighborhood defects. This depreciated value of the improvements is added to the estimate of site
value, including the estimated contribution to value by site improvements, to conclude the estimate of market value for the entire property.
The primary justification for this approach is that a typical investor
would not typically be willing to pay more for the subject property
than it would cost him to produce a suitable substitute.
The direct sales comparison or market approach estimates the
market vaiur- of the subject property by comparing prices paid in the
market for ^iTilar properties. The comparable sales are chosen from
those recently sole! properties that would generally compete for the
same investors in the market..' Comparison may be made of the whole
comparable property to the subject, or of some element, such a? the
ratio of gross income to sales price or the sales price per square
foot, per room, or per some other unit of comparison. Then appropriate adjustments are made for any differences. From the soles
prices or the adjusted sales prices of the comparable sales, the
most probable selling price of the subject is estimated. Primary
justification for the validity of this approach is that an investor*
would not typically be willing to pay more for the subject property
than it would cost him to purchase a suitable, existing substitute
available in the market.
The third approach is the capitalization or income approach.
The application of this approach commences with an estimate of market
rent and the appropriate expense ratio for the subject property. The
expenses are deducted from the effective gross income to estimate the
net operating income, which is capitalized into an estimate of market
value by the use of appropriate rates developed in the market. These
rates are bosed upon returns on and of capital investment typically
required by investors in the market. One justification for this
approach ic tort an investor would not typically pay more for the
income stream produced by the subject r.han he would pay for a suitable
substitute or. the marker. Further justification is that the market
value of the rubject property is the present worth to the investor of
ail of the future benefits (returns on and of equity investment) to
be derived fr-vm holding title to the subject property.

- 2 -

Finally, these data are further considered in a reconciliation
of the approaches and final estimate of value. Each of the three
previously described approaches represents one of the three alternatives available to a typical investor in the real estate market.
This is to say that a typical investor in the subject property may
acquire a site and construct a suitable substitute; may go into the
market and purchase a suitable existing substitute; or may acquire a
suitable, competing, substitute investment that will generate a
similarly acceptable return. These three approaches are then comeluded to be the most likely course of action for the subject property, which becomes :he final estimate of value as of the date of
the appraisal.

ADDENDUM "E"
AFFIDAVITS OF KENNETH ESPLIN AND D. BRUCE WHITED

KEN CHAMBERLAIN [0608]
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
76 SOUTH MAIN, P.O. BOX TOO
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
TELEPHONE: 896-4461
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE Of UTAH
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HARRY THDRSFN,
Plaintiff,

vs
MARKAY JOHNSON, et al.,

AFFIDAVIT OF KEN ESPLIN
CONCERNING DAMAGES

Defendants.
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et. al„.
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2.

That he repeats

the same background

experience

credentials and foundational statements he made as a basis foi
and authorizing his expressing or testifying as

to an opinioi

concerning value of land,
3.

That as he testified in the captioned case at the

time to trial he has inspected the real property known as the
proposed Gooseberry Estates Subdivision.
4.
experience

Using

to which

incorporating

the
he

same

background,

testified

in

the

all the same by reference

credentials

captioned

in

anc

case anc

this Affidavit he

expresses the following opinions:
(a)

He reiterates the testimony that the real propertj

subject of litigation consisting of approximately 50.9 acres was
worth, without

any

improvements

in* the year

1980

the

sum of

$1250.00 per acre.
(b)

That it is not economically feasible to develop

the land as a subdivision or for any other purposes without a
complete restoration of the soil, the surface, the vegetation (or
at least a substantial degree of vegetation including trees) as
would be required in order to develop the land for any purpose.
(c)

He is of the opinion that the highest and best use

of the property in 1980 prior to the excavation made thereon by
the defendant Harry Thorsen was as a subdivision or a mountain
lot development.

That was

the highest and best use then and

there were no other uses available for the land then except for

(d)

He ha.s n J W reviewed evidence of D
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KEN CHAMBERLAIN [uouo,
OLSEN, McIFF h CHAMBER!^ .N
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
76 SOUTH MAIN, P.O. BOX 100
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84 701
TELEPHONE: 896-A461
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HARRY THORSEN,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT CF
D. BRUCE WHITED
DTTCH RESTORATION COST
AND SUMMARi

vs.
MARKAY JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 8-61
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al.,
Fiamtiff s,
vs.
HARRY IHORSt N .mil
GATES,
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Defendants.

i

)
: SS

COUNTY

)
I1
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WHITED,
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fir

deposes and says:
Thar he is a d'^y licensed professional engineer having
in

ili.it

profession

sino.1

I'lbH

II'1

is

A

graduate

engineer from the University of Utah; and as a civil engineer was

- 2 President and Manager of Canyon Lands Engineering Corporation, a
Richfield,

Utah

engineering

firm;

has

been

a civil

engineei

designing and supervising the construction of municipal water,
sewer, street, highway, bridge and other infra-structural systems
and has designed and supervised

the construction of dams anc

airports; that he is familiar with rules, regulations, ordinances
in general or special laws related to all types of subdivisions.
During the last twenty years he has supervised the development of
mountain

subdivisions,

included

in

the

among

captioned

them

the

litigation,

types
and

of

has

development
comprehensive

knowledge concerning the economics of such endeavors.
D. Bruce Whited makes

the

following

statement under

oath concerning the Gooseberry Estate Subdivision:
I have
present

physically

condition

of

the

inspected
proposed

hereinafter described; have investigated

and

know

mountain

the past

and

subdivision

the cost of restoring

the land to a condition comparable to its condition before any
unauthorized

excavation or trenching

of a ditch thereupon was

made in approximately 1980 and effect thereof and the condition
of said land if attempts are made to restore it to its former
condition.
DITCH RESTORATION COST AND SUMMARY
PROJECT LOCATION:
Gooseberry Estates Subdivision, Sevier County, Utah

- 3 -

INTRODUCTION:
In

order

to

determine

restoration in^iei f
1 .tne

^ first

the

cost

of

n

i-Jentxiy

ne^essarv

*rea

nd

-viisturbed

ond; t i o n

defin;
been d e s t r o y e d and can n e v t ;
SCOPE:

For t h e pi lrpose

scope

luD.icaiec

f

. re«toratir

e l e - i ' ; >r <• .1*1 mnrni r

*.

scupte
a •:

i r e s s any

doe*
-^racc

roedsure:*

^*s -

* e •?the e x c a v d U u

i

t

*- ^

. *
nor does :•

*t>t

ic «%c

, .

rt\

imiuvl

ih

reolo j - -

UUSL C&LIUIO

. .v , ,..,

origira:

the

r ^r -»! lv * e^tox

•
•-tit'jfCt

, J ltc

this

•--

.ired

- ea tc r~ ar
UL>

suitab.e

i n c l u d e an
^ree

grcvtb

camouflage t h e sea

- 1 . - , *<•*

proper.y

backfjl

•

•

i

m a i n t e n a n c e t h a t wiLi be r e q u i r e d .
CKNRH/M

lMM

iMH •
The

:

on-sitt

inspection

"

the

area

revealed

th<

f o l l o w i n g i t e in s * L C U 11 c e r n :
Jl .

The wuik a r e a i s c o n f i n e d and w i l l r e q u i r e

considerable

h a n (1 1 a h * •> r f 0 1: e s 10 r e I t p r 0 p e r l y ,
1" ,

Pi'opet
I 11

(, ui'ib Lruct ion melhoiis and equipment

e o n t r a c t o r wi 11

be

1 1»cjuired

a d d 1 (' i, 11 n< 1 I »1.1 ma ge 1* I <l I 11 e

H

te

A

.

10 u 1 der

s e l e c t i o n b]
-^ minimizi

- 4 There are numerous

large rocks and

tree debris thai

cannot be incorporated in the backfill.
will have to be removed

from

the

This materia]

site and properly

disposed of.
The

soil

conditions

excavation.

vary

along

the

length

of

the

In those areas where bedrock and heavj

clays were encountered additional fill material will be
required to provide a proper seedbed.
The

newly

excavated

barrier along

ditch

the entire

has

created

a

drainage

length of the subdivision.

Special preventive measures must be incorporated intc
the restoration process

to prevent

destroying the completed work.

storm water fron

Loosely compacted soil

in a confined excavation of this type is easily eroded
if the ditch

is not properly

compacted.

If erosion

control structures are not installed, it is likely that
a storm of moderate intensity would cause considerable
damage to both the restored area as well as the lower
adjacent property.

COST ESTIMATE
The cost

to restore

and contour are:

the excavation

to

its original
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Item

Cost

Bark f I'" 4 " ompac t ing
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Seedbed preparation
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Erosion control structure
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Supervise*-- -r- * ^r : ^tenance

5,000

7.

i
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.p

4

0

3,500
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Total Cost

334,700

ECONOMICS OF CONTINUING THE PROJECT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS
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- 6 It

is

my

excavation on the

opinion

that

because

of

11 previously undisturbed

the

extensive

lots, 9 of whict

border the Meadow, lot sales will not average $12,000.

There are

now 18 lots out of 33 lots which will have major, highly visible
swaths cut through the center, or near center.
are no longer prime.
been

decreased

in

The prime lots

In addition, even the undisturbed lots have
value

because

the

general

conditions

anc

overall aesthetics of the project have been adversely effected.
In summary,

the development

costs

(all fixed costs)

have remained the same but the ability to make a profit frou
subdividing the property no longer exists.
the

project

has

been

decreased

by

an

The overall value of
amount

equal

to the

projected minimum of profit.
/s/ D. Bruce Whited
D. Bruce Whited, P.E.
License No.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public,
this

day of February, 1988.

±UResiding At:
My Commission Expires:

Notary Public

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF -_Aw, AND JUDGMENT

*™es"m
£EN CHAMBERLAIN
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS JOHNSON
AND PLAINTIFFS GOOSEBERRY ESTATF-S
76 SOUTH MAIN STREET
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
TELEPHONE: 896-4461
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,

HARRY THORSEN,
Plaintiff,
-vsCivi, ;., . 84bi

MARKAY JOHNSON and BRYCE
JOHNSON, individually, and
MARKAY JOHNSON and BRYCE
JOHNSON dba GOOSEBERRY ESTATE:
,i partnership,

AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants.

GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, a
partnership consisting of
TOKACO ENTERPRISES (itself a
family partnership consisting
of William T. Gardner and his
children William Todd Gardner,
Kari Ann Gardner and Corrina
Ann Gardner), LATIGO, INC., a
corporation; TELL W. GARDNER;
SadCfc 30¥^SO^-, ViKBS^I 30TOSSO^
and LEONARD V. ELFERVIG, all
doing business as Gooseberry
Estates, a Utah partnership,

Cv*i\ Yk>. %56tf

Plaintiffs,
)

HARRY THORSEN and DONALD GATES, )
DP

t-'T'K.; W '

r

- 2 This matter came on regularly for non-jury trial on the
26th, 27th and 31st days of August, 1982, before the Honorable
Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, in the Courtroom of the Sevier
County

Courthouse

Jackson, Mclff

at

Richfield,

& Mower

Utah, Norman

appearing

H.

Jackson

in Civil No. 8461

of

for the

Plaintiff, Harry Thorsen, and Ken Chamberlain appearing for the
Defendant Gooseberry Estates and others and appearing for the
Plaintiffs in Civil No. 8564 and Norman H. Jackson appearing as
counsel for the Defendants in Civil No. 8564; and evidence, both
oral and documentary, including exhibits having been offered and
received

and the Court having heard arguments by counsel on

behalf of all parties and being fully advised in the premises,
NOW FINDS:
[Case No. 8461]
1.

The Plaintiff Harry Thorsen is entitled to judgment

against Markay Johnson and Bryce Johnson, individually, and Marka]
Johnson and Bryce Johnson dba Gooseberry Estates, a partnership,
for

damages

interference

in

the

with

amount

of

Plaintiff's

$240.00, resulting
water

rights

and

from

both

their

ditches

issuing, arising and flowing from the spring area located upon
the following described lands in Sevier County, State of Utah:
Commencing 443.49 feet North and 155.57 feet
East from the Southwest Corner of Section 19,
Township 22 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake
Base & Meridian, and running thence North
17°41f East 470 feet; thence North 37°02'
West 208 feet; thence North 24°01' West 127
feet; thence North 74°51! East 213 feet;

- 3 thence J U U U I ou J*
£abl u u ieet; uhence
South k\°k'V
East 208 feet; thence South
39°ir East 68 feet; thence South 53°01' East
125 feet; thence South - V 3 9 ' West 493 feet;
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North
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- 4 when the Plaintiffs in this Civil action made application to
change the point of diversion and place of use of their water
rights for the subdivision;
3.

The Court finds that Plaintiff Gooseberry Estates,

its partners

and

those whom

they had

engaged

to

survey the

property above-described for the purpose of laying out lots all
went over and across the property and when they examined the
property no one found that there was in existence a "lower ditch,f
and the Court finds that there had been a ditch anciently there
but the ditch had not been used frequently and in fact had been
used very infrequently, had been washed out in numerous places
and

lost

its

integrity

as

an

irrigation

ditch

and

for

all

practicable purposes it was not being used as an irrigation ditch
for in excess of fifteen years;
4.

The Court finds that there was another ditch known

as the "extension ditch" above the old ditch which, for all
practicable purposes, had become the main irrigation ditch of the
Gooseberry

system

which

the

Gooseberry

Irrigation

Company

maintained and which delivered the water to the Thorsen premises;
5.

The Court finds that the Defendant in Civil No.

8564, Harry Thorsen, retained the services of Mr, Donald Gates,
the other Defendant, for the purpose of cleaning this ancient
ditch and for purposes known only to himself, the said Harry
Thorsen; but that the purposes for which he was repairing this

sc

- 5 ditch

were

not

valid

purposes

and

particularly

under

these

circumstances;
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- 6 9.

The Court finds that the Defendant Harry Thorsen

conducted this activity upon his own; that he did not consult with
the Gooseberry Irrigation Company and was not directed by the
Irrigation Company so to act and that Harry Thorsen, in essence,
was taking his own water under his rights and that he did the
heavy

equipment work

in this way

for

the

direct purpose of

injuring the Plaintiffs (in Civil action No. 8564).

The Court

finds that the only purpose it, the Court, can determine was to
have the luxury of an extra ditch which the Court

finds is

senseless under the circumstances in considering the use of Harry
Thorsen1s neighbors1 premises;
10.

The Court likewise finds that the Defendant Harry

Thorsen did not clean the ditch on his own land and did not clean
the ditch in such a way that the ditch had any value.
in examining

The Court

the premises went up to the where the cleaning

commenced and it is the opinion of the Court that less than half
of one second foot of water could have gone over or through the
ditch;
11.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs in Civil No.

8564 have been damaged.

The Court finds that there were nine (9)

lots which were totally destroyed and the Court fixes the value
of $6,000.00 per

lot in their condition at the time of the

aforesaid events and not in the condition they would have become
upon full development but rather upon the basis of improvements
done upon those lots up to the time the Defendant (in this second

- 7 action*, Harry Thorsen, conducted the excavation
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(12%) per cent; per annum.
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describe J in tne Complain' u

Livi

/.

£-*bl .

DATED d ^ s ^ ~ * ^ ^
" V —
" ^ S ^ R I ^ t JUDGE

^V! C R COUNTY
r.:n: : •"•::"••

«fr^£

IS32 DEC 2 2

k\\\\'-Sk

IK THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,.
-••••;; :i-:'jL" ~ N . C L ^ : V

'-;/?i^^n-c>V: '''

STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * l ^ '

/Z0-p-WL4^

HARRY THORSEN,
Plaintiff,
-vsMARKAY JOHNSON and BRYCE
JOHNSON, individually, and
MARKAY JOHNSON and BRYCE
JOHNSON dba GOOSEBERRY ESTATES
a partnership,

Civil No. 8461

Defendants.
AMENDED JUDGMENT
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, a
partnership consisting of
TOKACO ENTERPRISES (itself a
family partnership consisting
of William T. Gardner and his
children William Todd Gardner,
Kari Ann Gardner and Corrina
Ann Gardner), LATIGO, INC., a
corporation; TELL W. GARDNER;
BRYCE JOHNSON; MARKAY JOHNSON
and LEONARD V. ELFERVIG, all
doing business as Gooseberry
Estates, a Utah partnership,

Civil No. 8564

Plaintiffs,
-vsHARRY THORSEN and DONALD GATES,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This matter came on regularly for non-jury trial on the
26th, 27th and 31st days of August, 1982, before the Honorable
:'or V

Tibbs, District Judge, in the Courtroom

County

Courthouse

at

Richfield,

Utaf „ Norman

of the Sevier
H.

Jackson

of

- 2 Jackson, Mclff

& Mower

appearing

in

Civil No. 8461

for

the

Plaintiff, Harry Thorsen, and Ken Chamberlain appearing for the
Defendant Gooseberry Estates and others and appearing

for the

Plaintiffs in Civil No. 8564 and Norman H. Jackson appearing as
counsel for the Defendants in Civil No. 8564; and evidence, both
oral and documentary, including exhibits, having been offered and
received;

and

the Court having heard

arguments by

counsel on

behalf of all parties and being fully advised in the premises,
NOW, THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiffs
in

Civil

granted

No.

8564

judgment

Gooseberry
against

Estates

Harry

partnership

Thorsen

in

the

are

hereby

amount

of

$54,000.00 minus $240.00 awarded in Civil Action No. 8461 for a
net judgment of $53,760.00 which judgment shall bear interest at
the rate of twelve (12%) per cent per annum from August 31, 1982.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

that Markay Johnson and Bryce

Johnson, individually, and Markay Johnson and Bryce Johnson dba
Gooseberry Estates, a partnership, the Defendants in the first
civil action are hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from
interfering with the maintenance of and passage of water along the
ditches described in Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact in Civil
No. 8461.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
certify that on
the ________ day of
, 1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, postage prepaid, to:
I

hereby

Ken Chamberlain
76 South Main Street
P.O. Box 100
Richfield, Utah 84701
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